Special counsel Robert S. Mueller III’s report on Russian interference in the 2016 election details areas of potential obstruction of justice by President Trump that prosecutors examined. Mueller did so even as he declined to make a judgment about whether Trump committed a crime.
Trump has repeatedly said the report clears him of wrongdoing. But the document lays out abundant evidence against the president, focusing on 10 episodes of potential obstruction, though Mueller ultimately concluded it was not his role to determine whether Trump broke the law.
“The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment,” the report stated. “At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment.”
[Mueller report lays out obstruction evidence against the president]
Trump submitted written answers to the special counsel, but notably declined to address questions related to obstruction. What follows is a breakdown of the 10 episodes Mueller’s team examined:
- “Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn”
- “The President’s reaction to the continuing Russia investigation”
- “The President’s termination of Comey”
- “The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him”
- “Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel’s investigation”
- “Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence”
- “Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation”
- “Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special Counsel removed”
- “Conduct toward Flynn, [Paul] Manafort, [REDACTED]”
- “Conduct involving Michael Cohen”
“Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn”
Flynn, the White House’s national security adviser, had lied to the FBI about his interactions with the Russian ambassador during the transition period between Trump’s election and his inauguration. Trump fired Flynn. The next day, he told adviser Chris Christie, “Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over,” Christie told investigators.
The report also found “substantial evidence” to corroborate FBI Director James B. Comey’s account that Trump was asking him to drop an investigation of Flynn when the president said: “I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go.”
Trump also directed deputy national security adviser K.T. McFarland to send an email denying that Trump had instructed Flynn to discuss with the Russian ambassador the sanctions imposed by the Obama administration. McFarland declined to do so, on advice of White House counsel, because she didn’t know whether it was true.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the same day it occurred. … [T]he President arranged the meeting with Comey so that they would be alone … which suggests that the President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear.” Page 45
- “[B]ecause the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he ‘hopes’ a subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of ‘let this go’ three times, and Comey testified that he understood the President’s statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way Comey reacted at the time.” Page 45
Why it’s complicated
- “Our investigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn’s discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those discussions in late January 2017.” Page 46
- “The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI’s inquiry into Flynn's conduct.” Page 47
- “The evidence does not establish that the President was trying to have McFarland lie. The President’s request, however, was sufficiently irregular that McFarland … felt the need to draft an internal memorandum documenting the President’s request.” Page 48
“The President’s reaction to the continuing Russia investigation”
Trump attempted to prevent Attorney General Jeff Sessions from recusing himself from the investigation before the special counsel was appointed. He said he needed an attorney general who would protect him.
Trump also tried to get top intelligence officials and Comey to publicly distance Trump from the investigation. His outreach to Comey came despite guidance from then-White House counsel Donald McGahn not to get involved in internal Justice Department matters.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and ‘stop’ the investigation.” Page 60
- “The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to make a public statement that would ‘lift the cloud’ of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not personally under investigation.” Page 60
Why it’s complicated
- “The President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI’s investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches … These requests, while significant enough that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the investigation.” Page 60
- “... the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI’s Russia investigation” Page 60
- “Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia investigation on his ability to govern.” Page 61
“The President’s termination of Comey”
The report indicates that the breaking point for Trump was when Comey testified to Congress that there was a Russia investigation but declined to elaborate or say if anyone on the Trump campaign was a target — including whether he had ruled out Trump personally.
Trump quickly said to Attorney General Jeff Sessions, “This is terrible, Jeff. It’s all because you recused.” Then the next weekend, the report says, “the President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used to make the announcement.”
A memo was drafted explaining Comey’s firing, but one aide wrote at the time that the White House Counsel’s Office had decided it should not see the “light of day” and that they should instead rely on justifications offered by Sessions and Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the FBI’s Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the investigation ...” Page 74
- “The President fired Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly, calling him a ‘showboat’ and claiming that the FBI was ‘in turmoil’ under his leadership.” Page 74
- The president “followed the termination with public statements that were highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after firing Comey, the President referred to the investigation as a ‘witch hunt’ and asked, ‘When does it end?’ Those actions had the potential to affect a successor director’s conduct of the investigation.” Page 74
- The president “said he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents. The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General ‘who to investigate.’ ” Page 76
- “[T]he President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department of Justice’s recommendations.” Page 77
Why it’s complicated
- “The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation.” Page 74
- “Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia.” Page 76
- “The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia ... the evidence uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies.” Page 76
- Trump’s claim that he relied on Justice Department recommendations to fire Comey “could support an inference that the President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both.” Page 77
“The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him”
Trump responded to the May 2017 appointment of Mueller as special counsel by saying he was “fucked” and that it was “the end of his presidency.” Trump insisted that Mueller had conflicts of interest, but was told they were meritless and they had already been a part of his consideration.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed.” Page 88
- “... McGahn’s clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein not only that conflicts existed but also that ‘Mueller has to go.’ McGahn is a credible witness with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.” Page 88
- “[T]he President’s sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a weekend — ‘You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod.’ — support McGahn’s recollection that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel.” Page 88
- “Finally, the President had discussed ‘knocking out Mueller’ … reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan to remove the Special Counsel.” Page 88
- “... evidence shows that the President was not just seeking an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel.” Page 89
- “When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying ‘[t]his is the end of my Presidency.’ The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying, ‘you were supposed to protect me.’ ” Page 89
Why it’s complicated
- “Even if the removal of the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new appointee, a factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the investigation.” Page 88
“Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel’s investigation”
The report says Trump, two days after the above event, also tried to get Sessions to attack the investigation.
He enlisted former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski in the effort, but Lewandowski dragged his feet. Eventually, when Trump followed up a month later, Lewandowski asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to do it. “Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through,” the report says.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President ‘shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel’ and that Sessions was going to ‘meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections.’ ” Page 97
- “The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew ‘for a fact’ that ‘there were no Russians involved with the campaign’ because he ‘was there.’ ” Page 97
- “Taken together, the President’s directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to ‘move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections.’ ” Page 97
- “Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s effort to have Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel’s investigation to future election interference was intended to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President’s and his campaign’s conduct.” Page 97
- “The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather than rely on official channels the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. The President selected a loyal ‘devotee’ outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had previously insisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testified publicly that there was no cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and redirect the Special Counsel’s investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly take any action on it.” Page 98
- “The President followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions’s resignation. That evidence could raise an inference that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated whether to comply with the President’s direction that Sessions publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to confine the Special Counsel’s investigation to future election interference.” Page 98
Why it’s complicated
- “The President’s effort to send Sessions a message through Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. ” Page 97
- “... it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding.” Page 97
“Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence”
Mueller fills in the details of previous Washington Post reporting that Trump sought to mislead about the 2016 Trump Tower meeting involving Donald Trump Jr. and a Russian lawyer.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9, 2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were ‘really bad’ and the story would be ‘massive’ when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to ‘leave it alone.’ ” Page 106
- “[T]he President rejected Trump Jr.’s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was with ‘an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign.’ The President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption (which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton. ” Page 106
Why it’s complicated
- “... the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy.” Page 106
- “... it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the emails to the public would … [impede] the grand jury proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings.” Page 106
“Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation”
Trump called Sessions at home in the summer of 2017 to ask him to un-recuse himself and take control of the Russia probe. Sessions declined. Trump asked Sessions in October 2017 to take another look at investigating Hillary Clinton. He also told him in December 2017 that if he un-recused, he would be a “hero.”
Trump told Sessions, “I’m not going to do anything or direct you to do anything, I just want to be treated fairly.”
The evidence Mueller examined
- “On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and prosecution of Hillary Clinton. … The duration of the President’s efforts — which spanned from March 2017 to August 2018 — and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is relevant to assessing whether the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as obstructive acts.” Page 112
- “A reasonable inference from those statements and the President’s actions is that the President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation.” Page 112
Why it’s complicated
- “... it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation.” Page 111
“Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special Counsel removed”
This episode was originally reported by the New York Times in March 2018, but Mueller fills in the details.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “... substantial evidence supports McGahn’s account that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and context of the President’s directive; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department of Justice, and should be raised with the President’s personal counsel rather than brought to McGahn.” Page 118
- “In addition, the President’s subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. … when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had used the word ‘fire,’ saying, “I never said to fire Mueller. I never said ‘fire,’” and “Did I say the word ‘fire?’” The President’s assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence.” Page 118
- “[T]he President’s counsel told McGahn’s counsel that the President wanted McGahn to make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with the President’s request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President’s order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction.” Page 119
- “[T]he President said he might ‘have to get rid of’ McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President’s counsel, that the President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate.” Page 119
- “Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn’s account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President’s conduct towards the investigation.” Page 119
Why it’s complicated
- “There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories were published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign.” Page 118
- “The President said, ‘I never said to fire Mueller. I never said “fire.”’ That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own — but different — recollection of the substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them.” Page 118
- “... it would be necessary to show that the President’s actions ... would hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to investigators.” Page 119
- “If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown.” Page 119
“Conduct toward Flynn, [Paul] Manafort, [REDACTED]”
Flynn pleaded guilty to lying and cut a deal with Mueller to cooperate — and accordingly had to withdraw from his joint defense agreement with Trump’s legal team. But Trump’s personal lawyer reached out to Flynn’s team and assured that Trump still had warm feelings for Flynn. The lawyer also asked for a heads-up in case Flynn had any “information that implicates the President.” When Flynn’s lawyer said such information couldn’t be shared, Trump’s lawyer said he would relay the message of “hostility” to Trump.
The report also noted that Trump continued to praise Paul Manafort, his former campaign chairman, during his trials and left open of the possibility of a pardon. Manafort also agreed to cooperate before he voided his deal by lying to investigators.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “When Flynn’s attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government, the President’s personal counsel initially reminded Flynn’s counsel of the President’s warm feelings towards Flynn and said ‘that still remains.’ But when Flynn’s counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President’s personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn’s hostility towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn’s decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation.” Page 131
- “The President and his personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort, while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to ‘flip’ and cooperate with the government.” Page 131
- “[T]he president’s statements during jury deliberations that Manafort ‘happens to be a very good person’ and that ‘it’s very sad what they’ve done to Paul Manafort’ had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort.” Page 131
- Portions of this section of the report were redacted for the reason of “Harm to ongoing matter,” meaning there could be more evidence that has not been released to the public. Page 132
Why it’s complicated
- “... would qualify as obstructive if they ... prevent particular witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement.” Page 131
- “Because of privilege issues, however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn’s counsel.” Page 131
- “Evidence concerning the President’s intent related to Flynn as a potential witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications with Flynn’s counsel … the President continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty ... stating that Flynn had ‘led a very strong life’ and the President ‘fe[lt] very badly’ about what had happened to him.” Page 132
“Conduct involving Michael Cohen”
While Michael Cohen has said Trump didn’t directly tell him to lie to Congress about the effort to build a Trump Tower in Moscow lingering into the 2016 campaign, Cohen accused Trump’s lawyers of guiding his testimony. And one key figure declined to dispute that.
“While preparing for his congressional testimony, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President’s personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should ‘stay on message’ and not contradict the President."
When Cohen didn’t contradict Trump (by lying), he earned praise.
The evidence Mueller examined
- “... there is is evidence … that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project …” Page 153
- “Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear that he would stay on message — which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony.” Page 153
- “[T]here is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen’s information would shed adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements.” Page 154
- “Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President’s personal counsel on August 27, 2017 — the day before Cohen’s statement was submitted to Congress — Cohen said that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, the President’s personal counsel — who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project — responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President.” Page 154
- “Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately urged Cohen to stay on message and not ‘flip.’ Cohen recalled the President’s personal counsel telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go ‘rogue.’ ” Page 154
- “Through the President’s personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen ‘thanks for what you do’ after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false.” Page 154
- “Cohen also recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President’s personal counsel, who told him to stay on message and everything would be fine. The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that ‘[m]ost people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble’ but that he ‘d[idn’t] see Michael doing that.’ ” Page 154
- “After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the President accused Cohen of ‘mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?)’ … The evidence concerning this sequence of events could support an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating.” Page 154
- “Cohen’s false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations — a goal that was in the President’s interest, as reflected by the President’s own statements.” Page 155
- “The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time of Cohen's false statements to Congress” and “the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was being pursued.” Page 155
- “The President’s public remarks following Cohen’s guilty plea also suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project. … In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and timing of the President’s provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the information that Cohen could provide as a witness.” Page 155
- “[T]he President’s statements insinuating that members of Cohen’s family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others. … The timing of the statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation.” Page 156
Why it’s complicated
- “... while there is evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony.” Page 153
- “Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen’s testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned testimony.” Page 153
